impact, to gauge size and persistence of shocks' propagation within and between sectors, and forecast their systemic real and fi nancial outcomes.
Ideally, a computable general equilibrium model specifi ed at a suitable level of disaggregation would allow us to identify the sources of shocks as well as the linkages through which they are propagated. In practice, formulating and implementing such a model is a formidable theoretical and computational task. At present, an increasing number of research resources are devoted to develop macroeconomic models with meaningful interaction between fi nancial and real sectors. However, work in this direction is still in its infancy, since workhorse dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models do not yet embed essential fi nancial structure or sectors, being their modeling of fi nancial markets and institutions highly stylized. 1 As a result, the available modeling technologies are still relatively underdeveloped. Some models analyzing the impact of macroeconomic shocks on segments of the fi nancial sector have been developed recently in some central banks and international organizations. Yet, the feedback effects of fi nancial vulnerabilities on the macroeconomy have been usually left unmodeled, since the output of these models is used mainly for fi nancial supervisory purposes.
2
Our modeling framework delivers joint forecasts of indicators of systemic 1. However, a rapidly growing literature, briefl y reviewed by Walsh (2009) , explores the implications of specifi c fi nancial frictions in the co yntext of extensions of the "fi nancial accelerator" model of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) , with work by Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010) at the forefront of this effort.
2. See Sorge (2004) for a review of stress testing, and Huang, Zhou, and Zhu (2009a, 2009b ) for recent contributions. real risk and systemic fi nancial risk, as well as stress tests of these indicators as impulse responses to structurally identifi able shocks. This framework is novel in two respects. First, it uses a dynamic factor model with structural identifi cation based on theory. This permits us to extract information on common sources of shocks contained in a large set of time series, and to characterize their economic content. Second, it integrates the dynamic factor model with quantile regressions techniques, which allow us to estimate and forecast the size of tail realizations of systemic risks. We make a distinction between systemic real risk and systemic fi nancial risk based on the notion that real effects are what concerns policymakers most since they are likely to entail welfare consequences. Our systemic real risk indicator is GDP at risk (GDPaR), defi ned as the worst predicted realization of quarterly growth in real GDP at 5 percent probability over a predetermined forecasting horizon.
3 Our indicator of systemic fi nancial risk (FSaR) is defi ned as the worst predicted realization of a system-wide fi nancial risk indicator at 5 percent probability over a predetermined forecasting horizon.
The underlying joint dynamics of GDP growth and the system-wide fi nancial risk indicator is modeled through a factor-augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) model, following variants of the methodology detailed in Stock and Watson (2002, 2005) . Estimates of GDPaR and FSaR indicators are obtained through quantile regressions.
Forecasts of GDPaR and FSaR indicators are obtained by inputting the predicted values of factors obtained from the companion factor-augmented VAR into the relevant quantile regressions. Identifi cation of structural shocks is accomplished with an expanded version of the sign restriction methodology introduced by Canova and De Nicolò (2002) , where shocks are identifi ed based on standard macroeconomic and banking theory. Stress tests of both systemic risk measures are obtained by inputting impulse responses to shocks identifi ed in the FAVAR model into the relevant quantile regressions.
We implement this framework using a large set of quarterly time series of fi nancial and real activity for the G-7 economies during the 1980Q1 to 2009Q3 period. We obtain two main results. First, we fi nd evidence of outof-sample forecasting power of the model for tail risk realizations of real activity for several countries. This suggests the usefulness of the model as a risk monitoring tool. Second, in all countries we identify aggregate demand shocks as the main drivers of the real cycle, and bank credit demand shocks are the main drivers of the bank lending cycle. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that shocks to the real economy are the main drivers of both real and fi nancial risks. Importantly, this fi nding challenges the common wisdom that constraints in the aggregate supply of credit have been a key driver of the sharp downturn in real activity experienced by the G-7 economies in 2008Q4 to 2009Q1.
The remainder of the chapter is composed of four sections. Section 3.2 defi nes systemic risks and describes indicators consistent with these defi nitions. Section 3.3 outlines the model setup, estimation and forecasting, and the procedure used to identify structural shocks. Section 3.4 describes the implementation of the modeling framework on data for the G-7 countries and the relevant results. Section 3.5 concludes.
Systemic Risks

Defi nitions
Following Group of Ten (2001) and De Nicolò and Kwast (2002) , we adopt the following defi nitions:
Systemic fi nancial risk is the risk that a shock will trigger a loss of economic value or confi dence in the fi nancial system. Systemic real risk is the risk that a shock will trigger a signifi cant decline in real activity.
We adopt these defi nitions for two reasons. First, distinguishing systemic fi nancial risk from systemic real risk allows us to better assess the extent to which a realization of a fi nancial shock is just amplifying a shock in the real sector, or originates in the fi nancial system. Second, fi nancial events that carry signifi cant adverse real effects, such as sharp reductions in output and increases in unemployment, are the ultimate concern of policymakers. The fi nancial shocks following the prick of the dot-com bubble in the United States in 2001, as well as those experienced in several other G-7 countries documented following, appear to have induced no signifi cant real effects. According to our defi nitions, these shocks may be viewed as realizations of systemic fi nancial risks, but not of systemic real risk.
Measurement
To control risk in fi nancial institutions, risk managers track value at risk (VaR). Value at risk measures the worst possible portfolio loss over a given time horizon at a given probability. To control risk in the economy, policymakers may wish to track measures of worst possible real macroeconomic outcomes. One such a measure is GDPaR, defi ned here as the worst predicted realization of quarterly growth in real GDP at 5 percent probability.
To control risk in the fi nancial system, policy makers may also wish to track measures of worst possible system-wide fi nancial outcomes. One such a measure is fi nancial system at risk (FSaR), defi ned as the worst predicted realization of the market-adjusted return of a large portfolios of fi nancial fi rms at 5 percent probability. Following Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) , this market-adjusted return is the return of a portfolio of fi nancial fi rms less the return on the market. We chose this measure for simplicity, treating the portfolio of the fi nancial fi rms as a composite asset. However, other indicators can be adapted to our framework, such as those based on distance-to-default measures as in De Nicolò, Hayward, and Bathia (2004) , those based on CDS spreads, as in Huang, Zhou, and Zhu (2009a, 2009b) , as well those based on expected shortfalls constructed on the basis of individual fi rm returns, such as those in Acharya et al. (2010) and De Nicolò and Lucchetta (2012) .
A Dynamic Factor Model of Systemic Risks
Denote real GDP growth with GDPG t , and the indicator of system-wide fi nancial risk with FS t . The joint dynamics of GDPG t and FS t is modeled by a version of the dynamic factor model (DFM) detailed in Stock and Watson (2002, 2005) .
The model is described by the following equations:
Equations (1) and (2) describe a VAR in GDPG t and FS t augmented with a factor structure. The dynamics of a (large) vector of series (predictors) X t indexed by i ∈ N is represented by the factor model (3), where f t is a set of dynamic factors. 4 Equation (4) describes the dynamics of these factors through a VAR.
As in Stock and Watson (2005) , factors and idiosyncratic errors, u t 1 , u t 2 , and v it are assumed to be uncorrelated at all leads and lags. Assuming fi nite lags up to p, and defi ning the vector of static factors with
, one obtains the static form representation of the DFM:
Note that ⌽(L) includes ⌫(L) and 0's, while G is a matrix of coefficients of dimension rxq, where r is the number of static factors and q that of dynamic factors. If r ϭ q, then ⌽(L) ϭ ⌫(L) and G ϭ I; that is, (8) is equivalent to (4). Substituting (8) in (5) and (6), we obtain a FAVAR representation of the DFM, akin to that adopted by Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005) :
Systemic Risk Measures
Using estimates of the static factors F t , the systemic risk indicators GDPaR and FSaR are obtained by estimating the following quantile regressions:
Denoting the estimated coefficients of (12) and (13) with a "hat," GDPaR t and FSaR t are the fi tted values of the quantile regressions (12) and (13) with q ϭ 0.05:
Measures of Systemic Risk Spillovers
It can be useful and informative to compute measures of systemic risk spillovers from real activity to the fi nancial sector (and vice versa) that are net of the impact of common factors on GDPaR and FSaR measures. These can be obtained by using the CoVar measures introduced by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) . Estimates of Co(GDPaR t ) and Co(FSaR t ) are given by:
The existence of systemic risk spillovers can be gauged comparing Co(GDPaR) t with GDPaR t , and Co(FSaR) t with FSaR t . For example, if Co(GDPaR) t Ͻ GDPaR t , then negative risk spillovers in the real sector arise from negative risk spillovers either in the real sector, or in the fi nancial sector, or both. However, positive risk spillovers cannot be ruled out, since improvements in real activity, or a reduction in system-wide fi nancial risk, can have positive feedback effects on either sectors. This is apparent noting that the differences between the CoVar and the systemic risk measures are given by:
Estimation and Forecasting
The fi rst estimation step is to compute static factors and choose their number. Since our focus is on forecasts of systemic risk indicators, we adopt the following forecasting criterion to select both number of static factors and lags of the FAVAR (10) and (11).
First, we use principal components to extract all factors with eigenvalues greater than 1, in number R. Second, we order factors according to their explanatory power of the variance of the data, and construct
Lastly, we choose the number of lags L and the number of static factors r ∈ F that maximize FPE(L, r) ϩ AIC(L, r), where FPE is the Final Prediction Error Criterion and AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion. As detailed following, our forecasting criterion turns out to yield an optimal number of static factors close to the number of dynamic factors obtained by applying the statistical criterions based on Bai and Ng (2002) .
In the second estimation step, we use the optimal number of lags L * and number of static factors r * obtained in the previous step to estimate quantile regressions (12) and (13) Note that these quantile regressions can be viewed as forecasting equations of systemic risk indicators. Using the VAR of static factors described by equation (9), we compute dynamic forecasts of static factors k quarters ahead. Then, these forecasts are used to obtain recursive forecasts of indicators of systemic risk using estimated coefficients of regressions (12) and (13). In sum, the foregoing procedure yield forecasts of GDPaR, FSaR, Co(GDPaR), and Co(FSaR) indicators k quarters ahead. 
Identifi cation and Stress Tests
We would like to know how systemic risk indicators respond to structural shocks in the economy. To this end, we can use impulse responses to identifi ed structural shocks through the FAVAR. These impulse responses can be viewed as stress tests of systemic risk indicators to these structural shocks.
At a given date, the size of these responses provides a gauge of the sensitivity of systemic risk indicators to shocks of a given (standardized) size. Between dates, changes in the size of impulse responses of the systemic risk indicators to a given shock can provide a measure of changes in the resilience of an economy to a given shock.
Orthogonalization
We can obtain impulse responses of "factors" to their orthogonalized innovations, and translate them into impulse responses of indicators of systemic risk in (14) and (15) via the estimated coefficients of the quantile regressions. Yet, orthogonal innovations extracted from the FAVAR estimation do not have any "economic" interpretation, although they have the useful property of being contemporaneously and serially uncorrelated. Their economic interpretation can be obtained through identifi cation based on some underlying theoretical model, as detailed next.
Under the assumption that the factor VAR of equation (9) is covariancestationary, we can invert (9) obtaining the moving average (MA) form of the factor VAR:
where (10) and (11), we obtain:
For the sole purpose of identifi cation, we make the simplifying assumption that the dynamic impact of FS on GDPG, and of GDPG on FS, is entirely captured by the dynamics of factors. This amounts to posit ␥ 12 (L) ϭ ␥ 21 (L) ϭ 0, and converts our forecasting model into the standard factor VAR detailed in Stock and Watson (2005) . Under this assumption, inverting (10a) and (11a) yields the MA representation of the FAVAR:
where
Likewise, the MA representation of the systemic risk indicators is:
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Theory-Based Identifi cation
Extending the identifi cation procedure introduced in Canova and De Nicolò (2002) , we identify a chosen set of orthogonal innovations as structural shocks if they satisfy certain sign restrictions on key variables derived from aggregate dynamic macroeconomic theory and a simple banking model. Specifi cally, the theoretical restrictions on the responses of key aggregates to structural shocks implied by an aggregate macroeconomic model are as follows. If a positive temporary orthogonal innovation represents a positive transitory aggregate supply shock, then it should generate transitory weakly positive output responses and weakly negative transitory responses in infl ation, depending on capacity utilization. On the other hand, if it is a real aggregate demand shock, it should generate weakly positive transitory responses in output and infl ation. Canova and De Nicolò (2002) show that these sign restrictions can be derived from a wide class of general equilibrium monetary macroeconomic models with different micro-foundations.
What are the implications of these theoretical responses for the demand and supply of bank credit? To answer this question, we use the implications of textbook partial equilibrium banking models, as, for example, described in chapter 3 of Freixas and Rochet (2008) , or the simple model in Boyd, De Nicolò, and Loukoianova (2009) . In these models, aggregate shocks can have an impact on both the demand for credit and the supply of funding for intermediaries.
Specifi cally, the theoretical restrictions on the responses of bank credit growth and changes in loan rates implied by these banking models are as follows. If there is a positive transitory shock to the demand for bank credit (e.g., because of a positive technology shock to fi rms generating an increase in demand for investment, or an increase in the quality of investment prospects), then we should observe a transitory increase in bank credit growth and an increase in loan rates. We call a shock generating these responses a positive credit demand shock. Conversely, if there is a positive transitory shock to the supply of bank credit (e.g., the supply of bank liabilities increases or banks expand by raising capital), then we should observe a transitory increase in bank credit growth but a decline in loan rates. We call a shock generating these responses a positive credit supply shock. Of course, negative shocks have all the signs of these responses reversed.
Note that real aggregate demand or supply shocks can affect the underlying drivers of the supply and demand for bank credit simultaneously. For example, a negative aggregate demand shock can induce fi rms and households to decrease their demand for bank credit, shifting the demand for bank credit to the left: this would result in a decline in loan rates ceteris paribus. At the same time, the adverse wealth effects of a negative aggregate demand shock may induce investors to reduce their supply of loanable funds to banks, or banks could reduce their supply of credit as they may become increasingly capital constrained or risk averse: this would result in a leftward shift in the supply of credit ceteris paribus. Which effect dominates on net will be refl ected in movements in loan rates and bank credit growth. If negative credit demand shocks dominate, then loan rates and bank credit growth should decline, while the converse would be true if negative credit supply shocks dominate. Table 3 .1 summarizes the responses of GDP growth, infl ation, bank lending growth, and changes in loan rates in response to positive structural shocks implied by standard aggregate macroeconomic models and partial equilibrium banking models.
Identifi cation of structural shocks will be conducted by checking whether a subset of orthogonal innovations of the FAVAR produces responses of the four variables considered that match the signs of the responses implied by theory.
Implementation
Our modeling procedure is implemented using quarterly macroeconomic and fi nancial series for the G-7 economies for the period 1980:Q1 to 2009:Q3. All series are taken from Datastream.
For each country, the vector of quarterly series X t in equation (3) includes about 95 series, which are detailed in the appendix. They can be classifi ed into three main groups. The fi rst group comprises equity markets data, including prices, price / earnings ratios, and dividend yields for the entire market and by sector. The inclusion of all sectors spanning from manufacturing to services allows us to gauge the differential impact of shocks on different sectors of the economy, as well as to capture the impact of specifi c sectors on systemic risks. The second group includes fi nancial, monetary, and banking variables related to credit conditions, namely, interest rates for different maturities, monetary policy rates, bank prime rates and interbank rates, bank lending, and monetary aggregates. The third and last group includes price and quantity indicators of real activity. This set of variables includes net exports, capacity utilization, fi rms' investment, consumer confi dence, unemployment, consumption and saving for fi rms, government and household, a consumer price index, industrial production, house prices, and manufacturing orders. In the reminder of this section, we fi rst report some descriptive statistics, then we detail the results of the forecasting model of systemic risks, and lastly, we carry out a benchmark identifi cation of structural shocks, examining the responses of the systemic risk indicators to these shocks.
3.6.1 Descriptive Statistics Table 3 .2 reports basic statistics for GDP growth (GDPG) and our systemwide indicator of fi nancial risk (FS). Three facts are worth noticing. First, ranges as well as volatilities of GDPG and FS appear to differ markedly across countries, suggesting differential sensitivities of these indicators to underlying shocks. Second, means of FS are generally small and not different from 0 according to simple t-statistics tests: this is expected, as in the long run the evolution of bank stock returns tracks that of the market. Third, the contemporaneous correlation between GDPG and FS appears relatively small, with no signifi cant correlation for the United States, Canada, Japan, and Italy, and a positive and signifi cant-albeit small-correlation for the United Kingdom, France, and Germany.
As shown in fi gure 3.2, however, the comovement between GDPG and FS appears to be the most pronounced during recessions and the latest "crisis" period in all countries. This suggests either an increase in the sensitivities of both indicators to common shocks, or a signifi cant increase in risk spillovers between real and fi nancial activity, or a combination of both. Furthermore, in several instances the indicators of systemic fi nancial risk worsen with no Assessing to what extent movements in real activity and the fi nancial risk indicator are primarily driven by common shocks or primarily by spillovers is especially important during periods of both real and fi nancial instability. Whether the recent crisis has been one in which the sharp contraction in real activity registered at end of 2008 and beginning of 2009 has been caused by sharp declines in the aggregate supply of bank credit, or alternatively, sharp declines in real activity are the main drivers of the reduction in the demand for bank credit, is still an open issue. Indeed, the conventional wisdom has been one in which the credit crunch has prompted banking systems to curtail lending, and banks' increasingly binding capital constraints have forced banks to de-leverage, with the attendant contraction of their asset size and further constraints in their lending capacity. Yet, bank loan growth in the United States and the Euro area, for example, has been buoyant since the start of the crisis, although it has decelerated since September 2008. This may suggest that the contraction in bank lending growth refl ects primarily the sharp decline in the demand for credit resulting from the severe contraction in consumption growth and investment. Identifi cation is essential to address these issues, and this is exactly what we do. Capturing the main drivers of the demand and supply of credit, and assessing whether shifts in the demand or supply of bank credit dominate on net requires identifi cation of structural shocks.
Estimation and Forecasting
We estimated static factors and autoregressive coefficients of each variable by principal components according to the iterative procedure described in Stock and Watson (2005) , and chose their number and the lags of equations (12) and (13) according to the forecasting criterion described previously. Notably, for all data sets of the seven countries our forecasting criterion selected the same number of static factors and lags: fi ve factors and one lag. As a cross-check, we also estimated the number of static factors chosen according to the Bai and Ng's IC p1 and IC p2 criterions, obtaining eleven static factors for the United States-consistent with Stock and Watson (2005) results-and between nine and twelve static factors for the other countries. We also estimated the number of dynamic factors as principal components of the residuals of each variable in equations (10) and (11), obtaining six dynamic factors for the United States, and between four and six dynamic factors for the other countries. In light of these results, and because our focus is on forecasting and on identifi cation with restrictions dictated by theory, we acted conservatively by treating the fi ve estimated static factors equal to the number of dynamic factors, essentially assuming F t ϭ f t , so that in equation (8) 
We used these fi ve estimated factors as independent variables of quantile regressions (14) and (15) specifi ed with one lag. The resulting GDPaR and FSaR estimates were also used to compute CoVar measures (16) and (17).
As detailed in the previous section, forecasts of GDPaR and FSaR eight 6. For the United States, Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (2008) made assertions at variance with the common wisdom, which were countered by Cohen-Cole et al. (2008) and Ivashina and Sharfstein (2008) , to whom the former authors further replied. quarters ahead were obtained projecting forward the factors through the VAR of equation (8) Figure 3 .3 reports estimated GDPaR and FSaR series, together with their forecasts eight quarters ahead of 2009Q3. Table 3 .3 reports basic descriptive statistics of the systemic risk indicators, as well as the difference between CoVar and at-risk measures. As noted, the latter measure is useful to gauge risk spillovers in excess of those implied by the dependence of both measures on common factors.
We point out two main fi ndings. First, means of FSaR estimates are very similar across countries, but their standard deviations vary signifi cantly across countries. The converse is true for GDPaR, whose measures exhibit marked cross-country variations, while their standard deviations do not Turning to GDPaR and FSaR forecasts, fi gure 3.3 indicates for all countries a V-shaped pattern of systemic risk indicators, with forecasts pointing at a return of these systemic risk indicators to their historical mean by mid-2010. This means that the model predicts a signifi cant decline in the size of real and fi nancial losses associated with tail risk events.
One intuitive-albeit informal-way of judging the forecasting ability of the model is to assess whether out-of-sample forecasts of the systemic risk indicator GDPaR move in the same direction of subsequent actual values of GDP growth. A full formal evaluation of the forecasting performance Fig. 3.3 (cont.) of the model is outside the scope of this chapter. However, here we report perhaps the most demanding assessment of the model's forecasting ability. Namely, we assess if the model signals a decline in GDPaR prior to one of the largest historical declines in real activity: that experienced in 2008Q4 to 2009Q1 in all G-7 countries. Figure 3 .4 reports the results of this comparison: the blue line is the outof-sample GDPaR forecasts made in 2008Q3, while the red line is actual GDP growth. Predicted changes in GDPaR and actual GDP growth go in the same direction for at least one quarter ahead within a three quarters' horizon (up to 2009Q1) in all countries. Although informal, we view this evidence as notable. The out-of-sample consistency of GDPaR forecasts with the future evolution of actual GDP growth for the most unpredictable Notes: GDPaR is GDP at risk; FSaR is the fi nancial-system at risk indicator; dcoGDPaR ϭ co(GdPaR) -GDPaR, where co(GDPaR) is the CoVaR version of the systemic real risk indicator; dcoFSaR ϭ co(FSaR) -FSaR, where co(FSaR) is the CoVaR version of the systemic fi nancial risk indicator.
event in decades suggests the potential usefulness of our model as a real-time risk-monitoring tool.
Identifi cation of Structural Shocks
We implemented the identifi cation procedure outlined previously by following three steps. First, we selected an orthogonal decomposition of the MA representation (9a). Second, we computed impulse responses of FAVARs for GDP growth, infl ation, bank lending growth, and fi rst differ- 
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Gianni De Nicolò and Marcella Lucchetta ences in loan rates for each country. Third, we checked whether the joint signs of the responses of these variables conformed to the signs predicted for different shocks by the basic macro and banking models summarized in table 3.1.
As a benchmark orthogonalization, we chose a Choleski decomposition with factors ordered according to their explanatory power of the common variations in the data, with factor 1 ordered fi rst, factor 2 second, and so on, and with GDPG, infl ation, bank lending growth, and fi rst differences in loan rates ordered last in each FAVAR equation. The simple assumption underlying this choice is that the casual ordering implied by this decomposition refl ects the relative importance of factors in explaining variations in the data, and each idiosyncratic component of the observable variables does not affect any of the factors at impact.
To check robustness, however, we examined alternative decompositions with inverted ordering of the variables, obtaining similar signs of the responses of each of the observable variables to shock to orthogonalized innovations. We also examined the covariance matrix of innovations of the VAR of each country, and such matrices appeared approximately diagonal in all cases, indicating that the ordering of variables in the VAR was not likely to change results under the casual ordering selected. Furthermore, the approximate diagonality of these covariance matrices also suggests that our results may be robust to alternative orthogonal decompositions-not necessarily recursive-that can be extracted applying the systematic statistical search implemented by Canova and De Nicolò (2002) . Figure 3 .5 reports impulse responses of GDP growth, infl ation, bank lending growth, and changes in lending rates for each of the G-7 countries. Strikingly, the response of all variables to all shocks at impact or for at least up to two quarters after impact is either strictly positive (in most cases) or nonnegative (in few cases).
7 Hence, according to table 3.1, under the assumed benchmark orthogonalization, all structural shocks in these economies can be identifi ed as aggregate demand shocks associated with bank credit demand shocks. The fi nding of aggregate demand shock as the predominant drivers of real cycles in the G-7 economies is matching the fi ndings by Canova and De Nicolò (2003) , who used only a small dimension VAR for the G-7 countries, but implemented a full search for shocks interpretable according to aggregate macroeconomic theory in the entire space of nonrecursive orthogonalizations of the VAR of each country. This fi nding is also consistent with recent work by Arouba and Diebold (2010) , who fi nd demand shocks as the dominant source of aggregate fl uctuations in the United States.
The fi nding that aggregate bank demand shocks are the predominant drivers of cycles in bank credit growth is consistent with their being prompted 7. The only exception is the shock associated with the third factor for Canada, whose responses do not satisfy any of the sign restrictions in table 3.1, and thus the results are unidentifi ed. by aggregate demand shocks. This result also supports the conjecture that slowdowns in aggregate bank credit growth are primarily the result of downturns in real activity, as they refl ect declines in the aggregate demand for bank credit by households and fi rms, rather than a reduction in the aggregate supply of bank credit. Recent evidence by Berrospide and Edge (2010) and Kahle and Stulz (2010) for the United States is also consistent with our results.
Notably, the fi ve identifi ed aggregate demand and bank credit demand shocks are not all the same, as they have a differential impact on GDP growth, infl ation, bank lending growth, and changes in loan rates within as well as between countries. This suggests that the sectors of the economy where they originate are different. As shown in table 3.4, the variance decompositions of the four variables VAR in each country show that the variance explained by each shock varies across both variables and countries, with most shocks resulting relevant in each country.
8
Similar results are obtained when we look at the impulse responses and variance decompositions of GDPaR and FSaR measures. As shown in fi gure 3.6, the sign of the impact of each shock on GDPaR is essentially the same in each country, although magnitude and persistence of these shocks widely differ. As shown in table 3.5, the relevant variance decompositions indicate the importance of each of the identifi ed shocks for the systemic risk indicators in each country.
In sum, all identifi ed structural shocks are aggregate demand shocks associated with bank credit demand shocks, this identifi cation is the same for all countries considered, and it appears robust to alternative orthogonalizations of the innovations in the FAVAR.
Conclusion
This chapter has developed a modeling framework that delivers forecasts of indicators of systemic real and fi nancial risks that can be updated in real time. In addition, the proposed identifi cation procedure allows gauging the sensitivity of these indicators to structural shocks identifi ed by theory, giving economic content to stress tests. The implementation of such framework appears promising as a risk-monitoring tool.
We view this framework as a fi rst building block for an analysis of the determinants of systemic risks. As it can be inferred from our discussion, refi nements and extensions of our framework are aplenty, since we have exploited the rich information provided by the factor model only in a limited way.
There remain deeper questions that need yet to be answered: Where do 8. The results echo the fi ndings of an increased impact of sectoral shocks on aggregate industrial production indexes documented recently by Foerster, Sarte, and Watson (2008) . these structural shocks originate? To which other sectors are they transmitted? In terms of fi gure 3.1 of the introduction, answering these questions amounts to identifying in which box shocks originate, and disentangles the linkages between the originating box and other boxes in the picture; that is, the web of linkages implied by the transmission mechanism of these shocks.
Answering these questions amounts to exploit further the rich information structure provided by the factor model. We believe that such an explora- tion is likely to yield increasing returns. It can guide a more effective integration of fi nancial frictions into current macroeconomic modeling, encourage the development of more disaggregated versions of such macroeconomic modeling by incorporating the insights of models of fi nancial intermediation, and can be a powerful monitoring tool available to policymakers. Carrying out some of these extensions is already part of our research agenda. 
